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JAPAN AND ElliIOPIA: AN APPRAISAL OF SIMILARIllES 
AND DIVERGENT COURSES f ~ , 
I Massay Kebede Howard Universuty j 
"1 
, The idea of a comparison between pre"1935 Et hiopia with Japan before 
.~ and during the Meiji Restoration arouses contradictory reactions among students 
of Ethiopia. Some find the idea indefensible , others judge it quite reasonab le and 
instructive. Those who reject the pa rallel do so by emphasizing the socia l gap 
which separated Japan and Ethiopia, while those who welcome the idea base 
.j their arguments on historical simila rities and on the identity of objectives of 
their respective modernizing circles. Thus , among the first group, Shiferaw Bekele 
contests the serious ness of a parallel between Japan a nd Ethiopia , arguing that 
the Ethiopian leaders ha d only a superficial knowledge of Japan and its 
modernization: "I see it written tha t Japan served as a 'model'. This word is not 
helpful because it gives the wrong impression. The knowledge that the so-ca lled 
Japanizers had about J apa n's westernization was at best elementary ... That 
westernization meant tot a l overhaul of state a nd society including its mores and 
values, eating hab its, dress and lifestyles was not a t a ll realized. Most thought in 
terms of superficia l changes.'" Bahru Zewde too, while admitting some ana logies, 
is of t he opinion that the social and technological gap between the two countries 
was so unbridgeable tha t the model of J apan "remained a subjective urge 
unsupported by the objective reality."2 
Among the group of supporters we find Addis Hiwet. He coined the 
concept of 'Japa nizer' to dis tinguish from "the ultra feudalists- represented by 
such grand conservatives as Taitu, Habte-Giorgis, a nd Balch-and the liberal or 
enlighte ned feudalis t s-represented by Tefferi and his corpora te group ... ,"3 a third 
group, was the group of Japanizers who saw in the transformation of post -Meiji 
Japan "a living his torical model for Ethiopia: the liquidation of feudalism , and 
the development of capitalism through t he agency of the modern s tate-ie a 
revolution from above." 
Why, then, do I bring back so controversial a topic when at best it can only 
promise the pursuit of fruitless controvers ies? This is because I believe that much 
can be lea rned about the causes of the Ethiopian failure to modernize if the 
concept of the J apanese model is t aken seriously. Its most glaring outcome is to 
impute the failure of Ethiopian modernization more to the lack of political 
dete rmination than to the inadequacy of the objective rea lity. Due to a subjective 
error, the failure was caused not so much by the inappropriateness of the 
objective conditions as by a falt ering political wilL While Japan pursued 
systematically a nd with great determination the necessa ry course of action, 
Ethiopia did not. In order to assess the reasons for the Ethiopian lack of 
determination, it is first of all necessary to determine with precision the 
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conditions for the acceptability of the notion of the Japanese model. 
IN WHAT SENSE IS THE NOTION OF JAPANESE MODEL 
ACCEPTABLE? 
True, as Shiferaw Bekele suggests, serious studies of the Japanese model 
were not made by Ethiopian intellectuals. Neither did the Ethiopian leaders show 
any determined will to follow the model, aside from superficial reference •. 
Nonetheless, despite their shallow knowledge, some Ethiopian intellectuals and 
political leaders were amazed by how similar conditions between the two 
countries were. Unlike Bahru Zewde's assumption, the similarity of objective 
conditions explains why some Ethiopians naturally referred to Japan. The 
reference was less the product of a conscious adjustment to a model than the 
recognition, almost instinctive, of a common objective legacy. 
In other words, if the concept of J apanizer is confined to the tiny circle of 
the radical intellectuals who wanted to correct the wrong trend of the evolution of 
Ethiopia, it offers little interest. Being a marginal, superficial, and, as we shall 
soon see, theoretically and politically ill-advised group, its impact was negligible. 
Where the notion of model becomes interesting is when we consider the attempta 
made by ruling circles to safeguard Ethiopian independence through reforms and 
the appropriation of Western technology. Tewodros and Menelik were 
undoubtedly set on this course of thinking. It was not a theoretical movement, but 
an option induced by the survival power of traditional Ethiopia. Reforms were 
perceived as necessary, even if they were not clearly spelt out. Above all. 
European weaponry was perceived as vital for survival. Survival means here the 
subsistence of traditional Ethiopia, that is of its religion, values, ruling class and 
social structure. 
According to me, this theme of survival alone authorizes a serious and 
theoretically fruitful parallel between Ethiopia and Japan. Actually, AddiJ 
Hiwet's definition of the Japanese model by such changes as liquidation of 
feudalism, revolution from above is most misleading. The definition empties the 
comparison of all meaning, if only because it is heedless of the fact that, iD 
Japan's modernization process, "ethics and social philosophy remained 
thoroughly Confucian and thus feudal,"5 and that "the great motive force iD 
Japanese modernization was the threat of absorption or destruction by the 
West."6 Only when the survival of a traditional elite is admitted to have been the 
main motive of Japanese industrialization can the parallel with Ethiopia become 
meaningful. The problem deals less with the attitudes of intellectuals than with 
the options of a traditional polity when faced with the threat of WesterD 
colonialism. 
Need we insist on Tewodros's modernizing ethos, especially on how close 
his inspiration was to the Meiji Restoration? As summarized by Sven Rubensoo: 
"Tewodros perceived as did none of his predecessors among the mesafint that the 
political anarchy, moral laxity, and technological backwardness of his people 
threatened national survival. The reforms he announced, the policies he tried to 
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implement, the very single-mindedness and perseverance with which he tackl d 
the problems, indicate that he aimed at nothing less than a national rev;: I 
combined with the transformation of his coliI!try into a modern state."7 Tewodr::s 
spoke in terms of restoration of the traditional polity, but such that it would 
counter the colonial threat. In no way was modernization equated with 
Westernization; rather, it was a survival option designed to endow the traditional 
polity with new material means. Tewodros's attempts to constitute a standing 
army, to introduce a separation between Church and state, to reduce the 
landholding of the Church, to institute Amharic as a national language, to build 
roads and bridges , and to centralize administration, are inseparable from his 
fanatical attachment to traditional Ethiopia, to its religious values, nobility, and 
imperial system. The reforms were perceived as necessary to salvage what was 
most precious and essential. They were infringements serving the higher cause of 
rescue, not views disparaging Ethiopian values and social fabric as rotten and 
obsolete, any more than they were meant to replace traditional values by 
Western ones. Reforms were sacrifices, flagellations for the purpose of national 
revival, such as only higher fIdelity could require. An inner evolution of the 
Ethiopian system rather than revolution was contemplated. Most of all, 
Tewodros's determination to steal Wes tern technology, as evinced by his attempt 
to manufacture firearms in Ethiopia, was an inspiration which was quite 
Japanese. 
The same spirit has animated Menelik's approach to modernization. He 
too wanted to strengthen the state through some centralizing measures and the 
construction of roads and networks of communication. He understood the 
importance of modern education and opened to that end the first school where the 
highest dignitaries were urged to send their sons. He was also "supremely 
interested in weapons and generally intrigued with machinery and technology" 
with the view of possessing "for himself and his people the power which resides in 
the white man's knowledge of things."B All this was desired for the purpose of 
restoring the grandeur of Christian Ethiopia. The nationalistic interpretation of 
modernization, and not as is now the case, the desire for Westernization, brought 
Ethiopian leaders close to the Japanese path. Incidently, Haile Selassie's 
decision to adopt a constitution which "was in many respects a faithful copy of the 
Meiji Constitution of 1889,"9 adds an argument to the thesis since, however 
Superficial the knowledge of Japan about Ethiopian leaders may have been, it 
.. Was enough to inspire them. Haile Selassie's preference for the Meiji constitution, 
if properly analyzed, would certainly reveal the choice of a development model 
c"ntered on the need to salvage much of the traditional system. 
Modernization understood as a way to ensure survival and rescue 
tradition is, therefore , the strong point in favor of a parallel between Japan and 
. Ethiopia. Even if the means utilized proved different, the same spirit has 
. doUbtless inspired both countries. Just as Japan wanted to appropriate Western 
-:nnOiclgy to safeguard its independence, values, and social system, so too have 
Ethiopian leaders nursed the same goal. It implied the project of modernizing 
-··"ULIT. social revolution, in the sense that it should come from above, but also 
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tha t it must avoid wrecking t radit ion. I call the Japanese model this project of 
modernization without Westernizat ion or, if you will, the enterprise of salvaging 
tradition. Modernization is not expected to come from a revolution, from the 
overthrow of a class by another class. Nor is it the product of acculturation or 
Westernization. It is not an aspiration, but a duty, an obligation to tradi tion. 
Focussing on modern weaponry, it is a rescue mission, no more no less . 
Let us now turn to the objection according to which this comparison does 
away with the chief issue , that is with the fa r-reaching reforms undertook bl' 
Japan, whereas no such kind of reformi st policy was ever planned, let a lon~ 
applied, in Ethiopia. That is what Marcus notes: though Menelik had heard of 
Japan and was stimulated by its example, "he opposed the thoroughgoing 
economic and social transformation that would be inspired by industrial 
revolut ion."lo Why did Menelik oppose, or at least did not fee l the need for. a 
radical transformation while being animated with the same spirit? Answering 
this question is knowing why the same goa l opted for divergent courses of 
realization. Since structural differences between Japan and Ethiopia a re beli eved 
to have ca used these divergent developments, let me unravel the similarities 
shared by the two countries. 
The important point is, of course , that both have escaped colonization. 
Seeing the imputation by mos t schola rs of underdevelopment to the fact of 
colonization, the preservation of their sovereignty is no small matter. The 
possibility of indigenous development being conditional on the maintenance of 
independence, the Japanese model could not have been better appea ling than 10 
Ethiopia. But, for the threat of colonialism to generate the will to modernity. II 
past of imperial glory, which creates the fascination and attraction of Weste rn 
technology while preserving the attachment to tradition, is necessary. Only then 
is the fear of being colonized surpassed by the desire to emerge as the peer uf 
European count ries. It then takes the clear form of restoration of pas t glor;·. 
Colonia lism contests a place previous ly held, and industrialization is the way to 
regain that place. In this way, the West is as much a threat a s it is a challenge. 
This sp irit of challenge and competition renders colonization all the more 
unbearable. 
Modernization appears as restora tion, a reinstatement of past glory 
because, as one scholar declared, t he "bes t way to look forward is by looking 
backward",,"11 It is the best way inasmuch as the future becomes not so much an 
aspiration as the duty, the obligation to retrieve one's place. This di alectiC 
explains t he contempt for the West and the fascination fo r its technology, both 
being but the desire to appropriate the technology in a context of preserving onc's 
identity. More than the lack of technology, wha t handicapped most colonized 
countries was t heir failure to foster ea rly on the ambition to acquire it . Firea rms 
were introduced all over the world before colonial conquest. Yet in most plaC('s 
they were used for mercantile purposes and not against those who brought them. 
In this regard, a pas t of imperial glory is quick to induce the desire because neW. 
efficient weapons do no more than stimulate a traditional leaning towards glory 
and expansion. 
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Heruy Wolde Selassie, the Foreign Minister of Haile Selassie, in his book 
written in 1924 E.C. after his official visit to Japan, notes that Japan and 
Ethiopia have in common uninterrupted and ancient dynastic rules '2 as well as a 
spirit of fierce independence and isolationism.13 They also share many identica l 
values, especially as regards warlike values l ' A similarity is also observed in 
their recent history, as both emerged from a state of anarchy caused by the 
supremacy of princes over the imperial authority,l5 In both countries, in their 
determination to modernize, emperors took the initiative, '6 for instance by 
according a new constitution to their people, by supporting the expansion of 
modern education. Summarizing his views, Heruy writes: "in many respects, what 
Emperor Menelik of Ethiopia and Emperor Meiji of Japan did is comparable,"" 
A more detailed account would find a similarity in the mystical a ura of 
emperorship in both countries. Granted that the two imperial systems were not 
totally alike, especially regarding their religious reference, nevertheless the unity 
of the political and the religious endowed in both countries emperors with 
unrivalled authority. In both societies, hierarchical authority was the foundation 
of the social fabric, even if the Ethiopian class system never reached the 
solidification of a feudal society. Likewise, a traditional type of nationalism, 
predating colonialism and centered on the defense of faith and socia l system , was 
the active and permanent drive of the political organization, The perception of a 
similarity in past history a nd in the defiant attitude to t he West was not 
confined to Ethiopian and Japanese circles. It was felt in Europe, especially after 
the victory of Adwa. Hess quotes a Paris journa l, La libert, which, after the 
victory, wrote: "All European countries will be ob liged to make a place for this 
new brother who steps forth ready to play in the dark continent the role of Japan 
in the Far East ." 18 
My eagerness to highlight affinities will certainly not convince those 
scholars who remain skeptics, inclined as they are to consider such similarities 
ins ignificant in comparison with the differences. The striking difference is, of 
course, the social and technological gap existing between Japan and Ethiopia. 
"Even before the Meiji restoration," reminds Bahru Zewde, "Japan had attained a 
higher stage of social development than Ethiopia in the twentieth century," 19 
Before the restoration, agriculture was in the process of being commercialized, 
and urbanization, with a fast-growing merchant class, was already on the move. 
The parcellization of power inherent in Japanese feudali sm better favored 
modern political developments than the Ethiopian system. Put otherwise, very 
much like European countries, Japanese society possessed the necessary 
prerequisites for a successful transition to capitalis m, Such conditions were not 
visible in Ethiopia so that, unsupported by objective forces, the attempt to 
imitate Japan was anything but feasible . 
Perhaps the strongest argument is the one pointing to imponderable 
differences in the very process of modernization of the two countries. Whatever 
the similarities and differences they shared, Japan was rapidly involved in a 
thorough social transformation while Ethiopia barely went beyond measures of 
centralization. By causing a deep social change, particularly the destruction of the 
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feudal order, Japan's radical measures accelerated the development of nati 
capitalism. Ethiopia shrank from altering the social system: apart fro"" 
measures aiming at strengthening the state through greater centralization, t{; 
reforms of Tewodros, Menelik, and even Haile Selassie have purposely avoided 
radical social changes. The inadequacy of the system to capitalist penetration 
thus maintained, modernization was condemned to be ill-sorted and superficial. 
Nothing, then, demonstrates better the incomparability of the two countries than 
the attitude of their respective leadership to modernity. Despite thpir 
nationalism and t he threat of colonia lism, Ethiop ian leaders never acted as 
radically and consistently as their Japanese counterparts. 
Insofar as this radical objection puts subjective factors above objecti\~. 
conditions, it posits the problem in the only way it can receive a satis fa ctory 
answer. For in clinging to the idea of the inappropriateness of Ethiopian objectiv~ 
condit ions to the growth of capitalism , scholars absolve Ethiopian leaders. Worse. 
they deprive themselves of the opportunity of understanding the reasons which 
are s till hampering the modernization of Ethiopia. Because the same problems 
persist, albeit in a different form, they produce the same effect: t he delay of 
modernization. A better approach is gained if we imply that, given the necessa ry 
determination, Ethiopian leaders would have certainly succeeded in making t he· 
required reforms, thus removing the persistent problems. This possibility ca nnot 
be excluded, in t he light of the vividness with which foreign threats were 
disce rned . As happened in Japan, the will to reform should have sprung from the 
need to salvage tradition, comprising among other things t he class position and 
interests of t he ruling elite itself. So the question is: What melted the 
determination of Ethiopian leaders? Specifically, why was the sense of threat 
changed into confidence , advising the postponement of reforms? 
THE SOUTHERN MARCH AND THE DIVERGENT EVOLUTION 
OF ETHIOPIA 
According to me, the southern conquest is the main reason for the 
softening of the reformist determina tion. It gave confidence to the ruling elite. 
particularly a fter the victory of Adwa. It instilled in "Ethiopians a fal se sense of 
self-s ufficiency and ill-prepared them for the greater danger of the 1930's."'" 
Marcus is even more specific: "The ease wit h which Menelik had obtained 
weapons led Ethiopians to conclude that the nation would always be able to 
purchase wa r supplies from eager salesmen. The leadership did not consider it 
necessary to build up an arm industry, with all the modernization and 
reorganization of society that such an effort would involve, but was content to 
fos ter the development of government and the tra ditional economy through the 
introduction of communications such as the railway, telephone, and telegraph."" 
Even if Haile Selassie had other reasons for deferring radical reforms, in the 
main he followed the same reasoning. 
Without entering into the complicated question of the real meaning of the 
southern expansion, we can confidently underline its anti-colonial spirit. 
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Designed to increase substantially the defensive power of the traditional polity, 
the southern expansion was indeed effective in discouraging, even in defeating 
colonial designs. That said, there is the other side of the conquest: the 
overconfidence of the ruling elite, leading to the deferment of necessary reforms. 
With respect to the resolution of Ethiopian leaders to stand out against 
colonial powers, however, one question deserves serious consideration: Were 
Ethiopian leaders as fearful of the colonial danger as Japanese leaders were? Not 
that they were not conscious of the threat as such, but rather it took them some 
time to conceptualize it. Even once conceptualized, it was mitigated by cultural 
proximity. Ethiopia being a besieged Christian country, the first reaction of 
Ethiopian leaders has been to consider Europeans as allies. Tewodros thought so 
and openly expressed "the hope that Britain would help him to modernize his 
country."22 Christianity created such a cultural affinity between Europe and 
Ethiopia that the Ethiopian elite was inclined to think that, rather than 
colonizing Ethiopia, colonial powers would want to help it modernize. Menelik too 
had difficulty in understanding why Italy would desire to colonize a Christian 
country. Some such consideration never crossed the minds of Japanese leaders . 
The cultural estrangement between Japan and Europe was too great to allow 
anything other than a stubborn and resolute defense of identity. 
This argument will not take us very far, however. Though cultural 
estrangement was universal in the colonial world, the Japanese response was 
unique. Moreover, Ethiopian leaders were promptly awakened to the illusion of 
alliance by the inexorable logic of colonial conquest. Even if the cultural closeness 
may have lured them for a while, it did not fool them. So the harder the 
awakening, the stronger should have been the resolution to modernize in order to 
counter the colonial threat . 
This brings us back to the southern conquest. It is the main cause for the 
retardation of Ethiopia: the so-called social and technological advance of Japan 
can hardly be a sufficient reason. China was at a level of social development 
comparable to Japan; it too suffered humiliations caused by Western powers and 
fostered a similar urge to emancipation. In spite of these coinciding conditions , 
China did not follow the Japanese path. Reproducing the Ethiopian experience, it 
even slipped into underdevelopment. So, the political will is as much decisive as , 
if not more decisive than the social stage. The important issue is to know why and 
how the will was prevented from adopting a radical course of action. 
The paradox of Japanese modernization is that a consen-ative class 
introduced radical changes for a no less consen-ative purpose , to wit the 
preserva tion ofthe traditional ideology and system of power. In fact, all the social 
transformation was inspired by one basic aim: the production of modern 
weaponry. The more we wonder how a consen-ative class could so behave, the 
clearer becomes the absence of other options. More exactly, the survival ethos of 
the ruling class could rely on no other option to achieve its goal than to initiate 
reforms which, however untraditional and detrimental to the ruling elite , were 
necessary to save what could and deserved to be saved. They were proper 
sacrifices for the purpose of rescuing the essential goal. Had Japanese rulers 
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other opt ions, such as the conquest of n ew territories, or the prospect of new 
resources, a llowing them the purchase of firearms , they too would have probably 
shunned t he antagonizing reforms. This does not mean that the Japanese elite 
was s imply driven by the absence of choice. The case of China showed the 
existence of another option as well as the irreplaceability of human decision and 
willingness to accept sacrifices . Japanese leaders opted for the most difficult but 
in the long run, for the most rewarding course . Herein lies their unique merit. . 
Ethiopian rulers were also confronted with various choices. Natura ll\" 
t hey chose the easiest way, the one with the least change and sacrifice. Th~ 
condition for survival being the upgrading of military capability, given additional 
resources, the hard way of manufacturing modern weapons , with the attendant 
far-reaching social changes, could be excha nged for the much more benign course 
of purchasing weapons. The case of Tewodros provides enough evidence of thi, 
imprudence. Beca use Tewodros could see no other way out of the danger than by 
the manufacture of firearms , he was driven towards the Japanese logic. Still 
alien to the idea of expanding the empire in order to muster additional peoples 
and resources, he was , so to speak, cornered within the limits of tradit ional 
Ethiopia from which he could hardly squeeze more surplus to buy weapons. Given 
the s ituation, what else could he do but to increase production? And thi s policy 
would mean reform s and the int roduction of new methods, in a word resolute 
moderni zation. 
Tewodros failed, at any rate did not have t he necessary time to nurture 
and launch the project . His irascible cha ract er, so little inclined to compromises 
and concess ions, his precipitation, and his intolerance of Islam and the Oromo. 
partially explain his failure. Characteristically, the need for more surplus led him 
to expropri ate land from the Church whose antagonism is believed to have b(>cn 
an important reason for his downfall. Still , the persistence of the danger and till' 
absence of credible alt.ernatives would have coerced Ethiopian leaders into 
admitting the need for reforms . To a ll of them, induding the Church, t h,' 
dependence of their power a nd influence on the surviva l of Ethiopian 
independence would have, willy-nilly, become imperative. 
Precisely, this evolution was totally obstructed by the southern conquest. 
The problem of obtaining more surplus to purchase firearms being solved , beyond 
hope, by the immense prospects of the southern march, there was no reason for 
change, no need for reform s. Rapid Ethiopianization and Chris tianization of the 
southern populations accompanied by the creation of a southern elite embedded 
in the state were all that was needed to ma ke additional peoples and resources 
ava ilab le to the Ethiopian state and ruling elite. The traditional tax rights on 
land and the sell abroad of exportable products were enough to purchase a 
sufficient amount of modern weapons. 
The choice of expansion rather than industrialization in the fa ce of 
colonia l threat differentiates, therefore , Ethiopia from Japan. The Ethiopian 
option was most natural and predictable. Conquest was in the very logic of the 
traditional system. As a revival a nd exaltation of its warlike values, it was liable 
to seduce t raditional lords. Most of all, conquest had the incomparable advantage 
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of not requiring change a nd reforms, Only the absence of any other alternative 
would have compelled the Ethiopian ruling elite to generate more surp lus 
internally, And s uch a course would have been mos t arduous a nd unnatural. All 
the more reason for neve r t a king t his course was the victory of Adwa in which 
E thiopia n leader s found the ultimate validation of their option , 
THE AFTERMATH OF EXPANSION 
Granted that the southern expansion stopped colonial advances, the fact 
remains that it did not remove the threa t a ltogether, As would be proven by the 
Italian invasion of 1935, the solution had obvious limitations, The purchase of 
firearms could not cope with a more organi zed and highly equipped modern army. 
How then do we account for the continuous postponement of modernization, 
despite increas ing threa t to Ethiopian independence, during t he rise a nd 
consolidation of Haile Selassie's regime? Haile Selassie knew that "as far back 
as 1925, Mussolini was making the initia l plan for the conquest of Ethiopia .. "Zl 
What if, by t he time Ha ile Selassie rose to power, all the Ethiop ian 
potential for modernization, all its J apanese cha racte rs had melted like the 
snow? If so, even if the Ethiopian leadership was aware of the dange r, it was too 
late : the path of change and reform was defi ni tively blocked, The main reason 
was no longer overconfidence, but a negative structural change due partly to the 
incorpora tion of the south, partly to the circumstances related to t he rise of Haile 
8elass ie, I will defme this negative development by the rise of autocracy, better 
still by the identification of m odernization with a utocracy, 
Marcus sit uates the premises of this evolution just afte r the victory of 
Ad wa, Menelik's "tendency towards autocracy became more pronounced after 
1896. Whereas previously he had rarely made decisions without the advice of his 
major makwanent, after the Battle of Adwa he acted independently, He alone 
wa s the Ethiopian state."24 To be sure, the prestige of the victory as well as the 
important resources of the south made t he state, i-e . the imperi a l throne 
increasingly independent and self-reliant. Neither regional lords, nor other 
t raditionall y admitted form s of power devolution could counte rbalance the 
a uthority of t he central government, By means of slow but cum ula ti ve 
centralizing m easures, regiona lis m , a nd with it the Ethiopian nobility, were 
progressively undermined_ We thus arrive at t he real , st ructura l ca use of the 
Ethiopia n failure to modernize: the progressive m arginalization of the nobility, 
The great obsession of Ethiopian emperors since the end of the Era of t he 
Princes , with maybe the exception of Yohannes, has been cent ra lism, The 
essential target of the 'modernizing' reforms undertaken by Tewodros , Menelik, 
and especially Haile 8elassie , has been the strengthening of the central 
government to the detriment of regional power, While this evolution was 
understandab le both from the viewpoints of avoiding relapse into the a na rchy of 
the Era of the Princes and of preparing the ground for moderniza tion, it has 
nevertheless generated, contrary to the traditional order, a grave imbalance of 
power in favor of the monarchy, 8ure enough, centralization is necessary for 
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modernization. but not autocracy which. instead. turns into an obstacle to 
modernity. 
Among the scholars who discussed the reasons for the failure of Ethiopia 
to follow the Japanese path. Kifle 8elassie Beseat is of the opinion that "the 
explanation lies largely in the sequence of historical events ... and not in an\" 
cultural or human factor that might predetermine the failure .... "25 Convinced ths·t 
Menelik "followed a bold policy of modernization from 1889 to 1913. as did his 
contemporary in Japan. Emperor Meiji-Tenno .... "26 Kifle 8elassie Beseat 
somewhat contradicting his thesis. picks out as a major ccmplicating factor the 
conservatism of the two main religions of Ethiopia. Christianity and Islam. He 
also underlines the absence of political stability: "Whereas Japan has had only 
three emperors (including Hiro-Hito) since 1868. succeeding one another 
peacefully on the throne. in Ethiopia. between the death of Tewodros II in 1868 
and the abolition of the monarchy in 1975. seven emperors had ascended the 
throne. following an armed struggle in each case."27 The third and most important 
factor is the unwillingness of Ethiopian leaders to apply radical reforms. In the 
words of Kifle 8elassie Beseat: "whereas the Japanese monarchy accepted " 
modern parliamentary-type Constitution as early as 1889. the succes8 ivc 
emperors of Ethiopia never displayed the political acumen to do so. thereby 
hastening their own downfall and. what is more . preventing the country from 
becoming really modernized."28 
Marcus too. in addition to emphasizing the lack of radical reforms on the 
pa rt of Ethiopian leaders. attempts to detect the factors which prevented them 
from adopting a radical approach. As he himself says: "The Ethiopian people were 
not so disciplined as the Japanese; the empire was newly established and i" 
administration still rudimentary. Capital resources were limited. and there were 
relatively few skilled and educated Ethiopians who played a significant role in 
political and economic life."29 Interestingly. Marcus adds the capacity of the 
empire to maintain the status of the wa rrior class so that "there was no 
structura l danger from an impoverished warrior class. such as had developed in 
Japan."JO This is indeed an important reason. given the widespread thesi' 
according to w!rich the decline of the Samurai and the resulting withdrawal of 
status respect31 are responsible for their conversion into a capitalist class. If 
anyt!ring. by creating the possibility of maintaining the warrior class. the 
southern expansion has averted the dissatisfaction. and hence the change of the 
Ethiopian nobility. 
All these reasons overlap and their ccntribution was not negligible. Still. 
there was no obstacle that a determined will to reform cculd not have overcome. 
80 that . as suggested by the quoted authors themselves. the great difference 
between Japan and Ethiopia was the low degree of ccmmitment. compared to the 
Japa nese leadership. of Et!riopian leaders to radical reforms. And if we ask the 
question of knowing what weakened their determination. the answer is the same: 
the southern conquest. More than social retardation. political instability. lack of 
educated elite and capital. the absence of reasons pressing Ethiopian leaders to 
realize reforms explains the postponement of radical modernizing measures . 
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Surely, no one changes unless there is reason for doing so. 
From the southern conquest also grew the premises of imperial autocracy. 
By providing fresh and important human and material resources for the defense 
of Ethiopia, the southern conquest could not but encourage the abnormal, 
tentacular growth of the central government, thus paving the way for autocracy. 
The inevitability of this evolution becomes evident if only we refer to the 
traditional conflict between centripetal and centrifugal forces. When modem 
means tend to promote a traditional longing, they are certainly adopted all the 
faster. Such was the frame of mind of Haile Selassie. Greater resources, modern 
means of centralization, copied from and supported by the West, enabled Haile 
Selassie, with the help of a relatively educated group, first to tip the balance in 
favor of the throne, then to breakdown the power of the nobility. A perfectly 
autocratic system was thus born, all the more defiant as it boasted about its 
modernizing mission in the face of the reactionary position of the nobility. 
In effect. most scholars situate the divergence between Japan and 
Ethiopia in the question of state power. While the Meiji constitution provided the 
Japanese monarchy with a modern parliamentary system, no such trend was 
perceptible in Ethiopia. This omission was the more significant since Haile 
Selassie's constitution was a faithful copy of the Meiji constitution, except on "the 
question of civic liberties and the power of the emperor vis-a.-vis the legislative 
body."·12 Whereas the Japanese political system increasingly tended to turn the 
emperor into a mythical figure, the Ethiopian system went in the opposite 
direction by concentrating all executive, legislative, and judicial powers on the 
monarch. This evolution is accountable in terms of political will and choice rather 
than in terms of social and cultural gaps. 
Addis Hiwet's classification opposing the ultra-conservative class of the 
nobility to the relatively progressive camp of Haile Selassie should therefore be 
revised. Some scholars go even so far as to describe Haile SelassieOs group as a 
radical progressive camp, thereby implying that the conflict between Haile 
Selassie and the nobility was none other than the struggle between modernism 
and conservatism. The opposition to the rise of Haile Selassie was surely 
inspired by traditional ideas, but in no way does it follow that these ideas were 
reactionary. How could they be so when they aimed at preserving the traditional 
balance of power between the throne and the aristocracy. Speaking of Balcha, the 
notorious leader of the camp opposed to Haile Selassie, an author writes: 
"Characterized often as a reactionary xenophobe, Balcha, as a Teferi antagonist, 
was a pious Orthodox Christian convert of Gurage origin, an excellent 
administrator and soldier, and an Ethiopian nationalist who at heart felt his 
Opponent was selling the country to foreigners."31 
For Ethiopia to develop a parliamentary system, the first condition was 
doubtless the preservation of the traditional structure of power. A modem 
parliamentary system could easily grow from the traditional balance of power 
between the imperial throne and the aristocracy. Modern democratic ideas could 
take root in Ethiopia only if they could lean on traditional practices instead of 
being merely hurled from outside. But with the progressive marginalization of the 
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nobility and the growing strength of the monarchy, the possibility of introducing 
in the constitution clauses on civil liberties and power s haring was irremediab!\' 
jeopardized. . 
What was highly abnormal in Ethiopia was the complete withdrawal of 
the nobility from the process of modernization. In Japan, the split of the 
aristocracy between a conservative sector and a modernizing camp was the proof 
that a significant sector of the aristocracy was actively involved in the process of 
modernization. No such split occurred in Ethiopia: the entire aristocracy wa , 
labelled as conservative and reactionary, whereas Haile Selassie and hi, 
careerists were considered progressists. So general a characterization smacks of 
manipulation. The conservatism of the a ristocracy was not negative either, sinCl' 
conservatism changing into nationalism would have rather compelled the class to 
accept reform s. No, the demarcation wa s a manner of justifying Haile Selass ieOs 
determination to marginalize the nobility in order to realize his autocratic 
design. 
The project of keeping the Ethiopian nobility out of the process of 
modernization has , therefore , split away the Ethiopian option from the Japane,e 
model. The J apanese path was designed to salvage the traditional system, a nd 
thus to preserve the ruling elite, from the higher aristocracy to the lower Samurai. 
This meant two things: the transformation ofthe traditional values of the ruling 
elite into a capitalist drive and the assumption by the same class of the 
leadership of modernization. The opposite took place in Ethiopia. Far from being 
transformed, the nobility, increasingly considered as an incorrigible reactionary 
class, was stripped of its power so that it sank into oblivion. State servant'. 
educated or otherwise, anyhow devoted to Haile Selassie, were the hap py 
substitutes. 
Contrary to the "reforms" of Haile Selassie, changes in Japan were meallt 
not so much to exclude the nobility as to force its conversion to modern methods 
and values. Take the abolition of feudalism. As an author pointed out, "in Japan. 
feudals are abolishing feudalism. In so doing, · they are of course changing 
themselves into another class."34 Indeed, the loss of income caused by the remov.! 
of feudal rights compelled the feudal class to recover it by using modern methods . 
Such was not the intention of Menelik and especially of Haile Selassie, who were 
rather distributing land and tax rights to their warlords in the south. This might 
appear as a way of showing solidarity with the nobility; in reality, it was blocking 
its evolution. And as the state progressively assumed the military and 
administrative role devolving traditionally to the nobility, these grants were 
insidiously transforming the whole nobility into a parasitic class. Nobles became 
absentee landlords , cut off from their power base and having no specific socin! 
responsibilities. What other terms than bribe and corruption can express the 
right accorded to nobles to appropriate and consume a surplus in the production 
of which they had no the slightest contribution? The image of a parasitic, usele:;s. 
blood-sucking class could not have been better mounted. That the practice of 
compensating the nobility with undue economic privileges for its political and 
administrative erosion led, first to the degeneration of the class , then to the 
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downfall of the monarchy itself, should not come as a s urprise . 
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